Pressure Eases, Resilience Remains—A Forecast of the Impact of Global Steel Trade Remedies on China in 2026

In 2025, while the total volume of global anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures targeting China’s steel trade reached a new high, their underlying structure underwent a critical shift: the proportion of newly initiated cases and the scope of their direct impact both narrowed simultaneously, significantly reducing the marginal constraints these measures imposed on overall export growth.

The core reason behind the frequent initiation of trade remedy measures in recent years lies in the fact that, due to the expansion of domestic steel production capacity and the continued influx of Chinese products, the steel industries in target countries have shifted from a state of “supply falling short of demand” to one of “overcapacity.” In earlier periods, these countries experienced a significant steel supply-demand gap driven by rapid economic growth and relied heavily on imports to fill the shortfall. However, Chinese products, with their substantial price advantages, quickly captured market share. To protect their domestic industries, these countries responded by launching trade remedy investigations and imposing tariffs, leading to a sharp decline in exports of the affected products following the imposition of such tariffs.

Looking ahead to 2026, the additional trade remedy pressures facing China’s steel exports are expected to ease marginally. However, the underlying risk dynamics will differ across various markets. In markets such as Brazil and South Korea—where oversupply is severe and intensive policy actions have already been taken—the policy focus is shifting from “establishing new defensive measures” to “consolidating existing defenses,” leaving very limited room for launching investigations into entirely new major product categories. Meanwhile, in core markets like Southeast Asia, where demand is projected by the World Steel Association to maintain steady growth of 3-4% in 2026, local demand will continue to rely on imports, and there is insufficient momentum to fully curb imports.

From the perspective of its impact on the pace of economic activity, the lagged effect of trade remedy measures—approximately 4 to 5 months—will dominate the overall export trend for the year. Based on this projection, new cases initiated intensively in the fourth quarter of 2025 are likely to result in tax assessments being imposed in the first quarter of 2026, thereby continuing to weigh down and weaken exports at the start of the year. However, as the overall pressure from new investigations gradually eases, it is expected that export restrictions will marginally loosen during the second and third quarters, helping to stabilize the export situation step by step. As a result, the full-year export performance is likely to follow a pattern of “initial weakness followed by stabilization.”

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I. Changes in the Trade Remedies Framework: A Decline in New Cases Weakens the Restrictive Effect

In 2025, global trade remedy actions against China’s steel sector continued to remain at historically high levels: According to incomplete statistics from Mysteel, the number of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and other trade remedy investigations or rulings initiated by foreign countries against Chinese steel products throughout the year reached 155, setting a new record for the number of measures involved.

However, China’s total steel exports have reached a new high against the trend, demonstrating remarkable resilience. The coexistence of “overall growth” and “strict enforcement measures” hinges on structural changes in trade remedies: the proportion of newly initiated cases has narrowed in tandem with the direct scope of their impact, thereby weakening their marginal restrictive effect on overall exports.

1. Decline in the share of new cases: In 2025, a total of 26 investigations were newly initiated in 11 countries and regions, accounting for 16.8% of all newly introduced trade remedy measures for the year—a significant drop from 25.0% in 2024.

2. Narrowing scope of impact: From January to November 2025, the markets involved in complaint initiation covered 11 regions, a marginal decline from the 14 regions during the same period in 2024. Meanwhile, the proportion of exported products implicated in these cases fell to 4.5%, a significant drop from 16% in the same period of 2024, indicating that the direct impact of the new measures has noticeably narrowed.

Although the scope of the new cases has narrowed, the concentrated implementation of several trade remedy final rulings within 2025 has delivered a precise and severe impact on specific product categories—among which hot-rolled coil steel stands out as the most prominent example. The imposition of anti-dumping duties on Chinese hot-rolled coil steel by Vietnam, South Korea, and other countries directly led to a sharp year-on-year decline of 57.9 million tons in China’s total hot-rolled coil exports from January to November 2025, representing a drop of 22.7% and causing China to fall out of its position as the largest export category.

Among the key regions where taxes are being imposed, Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Egypt together accounted for an export reduction of 4.72 million tons, representing 81.5% of the total reduction in hot-rolled steel exports. The impact exhibits a high degree of market and product category concentration. This fact precisely underscores that, had the scope of newly reported cases not been narrowed, the overall drag on exports would have been even more severe.

II. Driving Force Behind the Measures: Domestic Overcapacity Forces Trade Remedies to Respond in Retaliation

The direct driving force behind frequent trade remedy actions initiated by target countries lies in the need to protect their domestic industries. The underlying reason is a fundamental shift in the supply-and-demand dynamics of the local steel market. In the early stages, these countries experienced rapid economic growth, and their domestic production capacity could not keep pace with the surging demand, causing the steel supply-demand gap to steadily widen and forcing them to rely heavily on imports to fill the shortfall. As domestic steel production capacity continued to expand and upgrade, coupled with the massive influx of Chinese steel products that boast significant price advantages, some markets have shifted from a state of "supply falling short of demand" to "overcapacity." This has severely squeezed the survival space of local industries, thereby triggering retaliatory trade remedy measures.

The case of Vietnam, China’s largest export destination, is notably representative. According to data from the World Steel Association, Vietnam’s steel industry has long been characterized by demand exceeding supply. However, in recent years, Vietnam’s economy has experienced rapid growth (since 2022, Vietnam’s GDP growth rate has remained above 5%), driving a sharp increase in steel demand and prompting continuous upgrades and capacity expansions in the local steel sector. For example, the Hoa Phat steel plant in Vietnam is set to commission a new hot-rolled coil production line in the first quarter of 2025.

As Vietnam’s domestic industry develops, the supply-demand gap for crude steel is gradually narrowing. Meanwhile, Chinese products, benefiting from their continuously expanding price advantage, are rapidly gaining market share in Vietnam’s domestic market. The price differential between China’s hot-rolled coil export prices and Vietnam’s local market prices has consistently remained above USD 20 per ton, ensuring robust export profits. This substantial price advantage drove China’s exports of hot-rolled coil to Vietnam to surge by 40.5% in 2024, reaching 9.224 million tons, severely squeezing Vietnamese domestic enterprises. In 2025, this price differential further widened to USD 42 per ton, an increase of USD 22 per ton compared to the average differential in 2024.

It is precisely this competitive dynamic—shifting from “filling the gap” to “exacerbating oversupply”—that directly triggered Vietnam’s trade remedy measures, leading to a sharp drop in China’s hot-rolled steel exports to Vietnam after tariffs were imposed in 2025.

However, data from the Vietnam Steel Association indicate that domestic demand for hot-rolled steel amounts to roughly 12 million to 13 million tons annually, accounting for nearly 50 percent of total crude steel demand. Yet, according to Mysteel statistics, Vietnam’s own capacity for producing hot-rolled coil plates and sheets is only about 10 million tons. This gap still needs to be filled through imports.

Following the implementation of anti-dumping duties on hot-rolled steel from Vietnam in 2025, China’s annual exports of hot-rolled steel to Vietnam have been adjusted to around 4.5 million tons. While this adjustment has helped fill the gap in Vietnam’s demand without causing significant market oversupply, the likelihood of Vietnam launching new anti-dumping investigations in the short term may marginally decline. However, the risk remains that Vietnam could still pursue “containment” measures—such as anti-subsidy actions—to further consolidate its protective effects.

III. Outlook for 2026: Newly added pressures are easing, and export trends may follow a “weak-first, then stable” pattern.

Looking ahead to 2026, the pressure from new trade remedy investigations facing China's steel exports is expected to ease marginally. However, influenced by the lagged effects of existing measures, the overall export trend for the year may follow a pattern of “initial downward pressure and weakening, followed by gradual stabilization.”

1. Pressure from newly imposed trade remedy measures may marginally ease.

Overall, the pressure from new trade remedy measures facing China’s steel exports in 2026 may ease marginally. However, the risk levels vary significantly across different destination countries, primarily based on a comprehensive analysis of the local industries’ capacity to absorb such measures, the extent to which existing trade measures already cover these markets, and their actual effectiveness.

(1) Overcapacity markets: The marginal space for new investigations is narrowing.

For markets such as South Korea and Brazil, which already face significant supply surpluses and have seen frequent anti-China measures in recent years, the likelihood of launching new product-category investigations has decreased. However, risks remain regarding the review of existing measures, adjustments to tariff rates, and expansions of their scope—for example, extending anti-subsidy measures beyond anti-dumping actions.

· South Korea: From January to November 2025, China’s steel exports to South Korea totaled 6.99 million tons, accounting for 5.8% of China’s total exports to South Korea. South Korea’s crude steel supply-demand gap reached 12.06 million tons. Against the backdrop of a relatively severe oversupply, South Korea is facing an increasingly urgent need for trade remedy measures. With anti-dumping measures against China taking effect over the past two years, exports of related high-risk products have continued to decline. According to data from the General Administration of Customs, from January to November 2025, China’s steel exports to South Korea involving anti-dumping cases (including medium- and heavy-thickness plates, hot-rolled coils, and galvanized sheets) fell to 3.16 million tons, a year-on-year decrease of 19.4%. Among these, exports of medium- and heavy-thickness plates—whose tariffs were first imposed starting in April 2025—plummeted by 38.5%, indicating that the existing trade measures have already achieved fairly significant restrictive effects.

Although exports of coated sheets, bars, and other similar products have increased, the export volume for the same period in 2025 was only 770,000 tons, representing a relatively limited absolute scale. Therefore, it is expected that South Korea will have weaker incentives to launch investigations into entirely new major product categories in 2026. However, it cannot be ruled out that investigations might be initiated on product categories experiencing faster growth and putting pressure on specific sub-sectors—for example, certain coated sheets and wire products.

· Brazil: From January to November 2025, China exported 3.39 million tons of steel to Brazil. According to data from the World Steel Association, Brazil’s local crude steel supply-demand gap reached 5.4 million tons, and its manufacturing sector continues to contract, putting sustained pressure from oversupply. In the past two years, Brazil has initiated eight anti-dumping investigations covering major product categories such as flat products and rebar, accounting for more than 80% of its steel imports from China. Therefore, in the future, Brazil’s trade remedy actions will inevitably shift toward “defensive consolidation” of existing tariff measures—using tools like sunset reviews and countervailing duty investigations to strengthen its protective barriers—rather than launching large-scale new investigations.

(2) Core Basic Market (Southeast Asia): Structural Risks Remain.

As the cornerstone of China’s steel exports, the Southeast Asian region exhibits a fundamental supply-demand imbalance—supply falls short of demand—making it economically illogical to completely curb imports. Moreover, the Short-Term Demand Outlook Report released by the World Steel Association in October 2025 indicates that the momentum for steel demand growth in the ASEAN (Southeast Asia) region will persist, with an expected growth rate of 3-4% maintained from 2025 to 2026.

Moreover, although these countries are expanding their domestic production capacity into upstream areas such as hot-rolled steel, they still lack sufficient capacity to produce high-end products (such as cold-rolled steel, coated and plated sheets, and specially specified sheet materials) at a mature level, and thus continue to rely on imports to fill the demand gap. Coupled with the fact that several trade remedy investigations have already been initiated against China, there is currently little urgency to launch another comprehensive investigation in the short term. Consequently, in 2026, the restrictions on steel exports will still primarily stem from the follow-up actions arising from the new cases initiated in 2025. However, this does not mean that the risks have disappeared. In the medium to long term, the risk of trade remedies in Southeast Asia is shifting from “comprehensive import restrictions” toward “protecting specific high-value-added or strategic domestic capacities.”

2. Impact on Rhythm Analysis: The lag effect dominates the “weak first, then stable” trend.

Take the hot-rolled steel products—frequently subject to trade remedy measures—as an example: In recent years, major destination countries such as Vietnam, South Korea, and Turkey have all launched anti-dumping investigations against Chinese hot-rolled steel. From the perspective of impact timing, there is a lag effect of about 4 to 5 months between the initiation of a trade remedy investigation and the actual imposition of tariffs. This mechanism has led to a concentrated surge in exports during the investigation window period, followed by a sharp decline once tariffs are imposed. This implies that the impact of newly initiated cases in the third and fourth quarters of 2025 will primarily take effect in the first half of 2026.

Therefore, the “lagged effect” of trade remedies will dominate the export pace in 2026, resulting in a trend characterized by “initial weakness followed by stabilization.” As shown in the figure below, from September to December 2025, a flurry of new trade remedy investigations targeting China was launched; these investigations are expected to culminate in the imposition of tariffs starting in the first quarter of 2026. According to Mysteel statistics, the volume of exports for products involved in these existing cases totaled approximately 2.71 million tons from January to November 2025. The implementation of these tariffs will deliver a concentrated impact on exports at the start of 2026, causing exports to remain under pressure and weaken further during the first half of the year.

However, given the overall easing of newly added investigation pressures mentioned earlier, the number of new cases in 2026 is expected to decline further, thereby significantly reducing the marginal restrictive effects of trade remedies on exports in the second half of the year. As these two factors offset each other, steel exports are likely to gradually stabilize starting from the second and third quarters. Consequently, the overall export trend for the year will largely depend on how effectively existing measures are absorbed, and then, against the backdrop of diminishing new pressures, the sector will seek a balance, exhibiting a “first weak, then stable” pattern.